The Berean Expositor
Volume 38 - Page 103 of 249
Index | Zoom
physical senses, or we may say that a remark is "senseless", intending this time the idea
"meaningless". Again, we may say that a person is very "sensible" and by so remarking,
make no observation upon the physical senses, of sight, hearing, etc., or we can, with
Macbeth say:
"Art thou not, fatal vision sensible to feeling, as to sight."
A "sensualist" may indicate a person who is devoted to the gratification of his baser
appetites, but the term may indicate a supporter of the sensual theory of philosophy.
Enough has been said to show that the first door by which perception enters is the door of
the five senses, and then, traversing the chamber of the mind, that which came in as a
"sensation" emerges as "sense".
The underlying substratum of all experience is twofold, namely that of space and time.
Every event that has ever happened of which the human mind is capable of thought must
have taken place someWHERE and at some TIME. Timeless immensity, while capable
of being written or spoken, cannot be comprehended. An infant entering into this world,
is immediately influenced by light, heat, sound, smell and taste. In course of time he
begins to associate these impressions with objects outside of himself, he reacts to these
sense impressions and experiences comfort or distress, and so feels an inclination towards
or an aversion from the origins of these sensations. Qualities such as hardness, softness,
light, heavy, rough and smooth, begin to enter into the mind, and a world "other" than
himself is recognized and accepted. Time is not associated in the infant mind with clocks
or the sun, but with sequence, repetition, succession, and that mainly as associated with
feeding, bathing and daily routine. Arising out of these experiences comes the need to
give them a name, and the first use of language is that of naming an object, of attaching a
signal to it that will recall it to the memory, and at the same time separate the named
object from others that are different in degree or kind.
It must be remembered however, that unless there were some intuitive sense, which
forms a part of the original creation of man, none of these external objects as perceived
by the senses would give rise to thought, reason or understanding. Certain axioms lie at
the basis of all the processes of thought, and are often of a mathematical nature, such as:
"Things equal to the same thing are equal to one another."
"The whole is greater than the part."
The "signal" thus appropriated to each object is called by grammarians "a noun" or a
name, which part of speech is defined by Aristotle to be "a sound which by convention is
significant, but does not determine the time". Aristotle here really distinguishes between
the difference between a noun and a verb. The noun represented a permanent thing, the
verb a temporary and transitory state. We are therefore dealing with "things" and with
"states". Nouns and names represent things, and consequently states must have some
other part of speech devoted to their expression. This power of expressing the various
"states" of a "thing" is the office of the adjective and the verb, and in reality every verb
can be reduced to an adjective--notion, combined with one particular word expressing
time, past, present and future. Thus "he writes" can be expressed "he is--writing". "He