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#25.
A Quest for Ultimate Value.
pp. 188 - 193
In the record of creation in Gen. 1:
there are seven occasions when the
pronouncements is made that "it was good".
The light (Gen. 1: 4) and subsequently the dividing of the earth and sea (Gen. 1: 10);
the bringing forth of grass, herb and tree (Gen. 1: 12); the rule and ministry of the sun,
moon and stars (Gen. 1: 18); the creation of all living creatures of the waters, and all the
fowl of the air (Gen. 1: 21); the creation of beast, cattle and creeping thing (Gen. 1: 25).
Philosophy is concerned with three great quests: the quest as to the ultimate nature of
reality, the quest as to the validity, nature and limitations of knowledge, and the quest for
the ultimate nature and significance of value. This third philosophical quest is called
Axiology, from the Greek word axios. Philosophy has arrived at the conclusion that in
the realm of Ethics or Morals "The Good" is the ultimate value; that in the realm of
Aesthetics "The Beautiful" is the ultimate value, and that in the realm of the Mind or
Reason, "The True" is the ultimate value. Nevertheless, although these ideas have held
sway since before the days of Plato, there has been in the minds of most thinkers a feeling
that there should be something which would bind together these values and eliminate the
disturbing relative elements the presence of which prevents many from accepting them as
ultimate values.
While we do not wish to discuss philosophical terms in these pages, we must take this
matter a little further in order to make clear our after-study. In the first place it is
manifestly incorrect to speak of ultimate values. There can be but one all-comprehensive
ultimate value, one that can contain "The Good", "The Beautiful" and "The True", while
excluding everything of a conditional nature that comes in these several categories.
The value, "The Good", is, after all, a relative form. In Gen. 3: the woman saw that
the prohibited tree was "good" for food, yet at the same time it was an evil for the woman
to partake it. She saw that it was "pleasant" to the eyes, which is comparable with the
aesthetic value, "The Beautiful", nevertheless, the word so translated appears in that
dreadful place Kibrothhattaavah, "The graves of lust" (Numb. 11: 34), showing that
"beauty" or that which is "pleasant" may be a relative term. Moreover, the forbidden tree
was one "to be desired to make one wise", which is comparable with the philosopher's
third value, "The True". It appears therefore that "The Good", "The Beautiful" and
"The True" still leave room for something that is impartial. When we read that the
weather is "good" for air-raids, what is intended? If it be "good" for the raiders, it will
certainly be "bad" for those who are raided, from which it follows that the self-same
thing will be "good" or "bad" relatively to circumstance.
Again, there can be no inflexible standard of Beauty. What would be the ideal in the
eyes of an African chief, would fail to satisfy the aesthetic taste of a Greek in the days of
Phidias. To one person a Symphony is a delight, to another a meaningless sound. Even