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Even this rendering does not impress the eye as would a reading of the original, which
is made more striking by the similarity of the two forms of the Hebrew verb "to be".
At the close of the record of the second day's work we read, "And it was so"
(Gen. 1: 7), and this phrase is repeated in verses 9, 11, 15, 24 and 30. Again, in verses 4,
10, 12, 18, 21 and 25, we have the repeated phrase: "And it was good." The appearance
of light, the appearing of the dry land, the gathering of the waters, the growth of grass,
herb and tree, the rule of the sun and moon, the creation of the monsters of the sea, the
fowl of the heavens, the beasts, cattle, and creeping things, are all said to be "good".
Light is certainly "good", but light is physical, not moral. It is impossible for the mind to
conceive of the idea that light could have refused to come into being when God spoke. It
would be equally impossible to think of promising a reward to the sun for ruling the day,
or of punishing the moon for causing an eclipse. In the realm of creation we are in a
sphere of mechanical movement, where everything is determined, where there can be no
option, no alternative, no choice. When, however, we pass from this realm of creation to
the realm of human activity, we leave the sphere of mechanical determinism, and enter
the sphere of moral agency, accountability and contingency. When God formed man of
the dust of the ground, man had no knowledge of his own creation, and therefore had no
responsibility for the form in which he was fashioned, or for the mind and will with
which he was endowed. The moment he stood upright, however, as a living soul, made
in the image and after the likeness of his God, he entered into a relationship with his
Creator, in which obedience or disobedience were equally possible, and in which
disobedience involved a penalty. At this point we step out of the sphere of Mechanics
into the sphere of Morals, where contingency is possible. It would have been impossible
without altering the nature of man, for such words as "It was so", to have followed the
command concerning the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Looking at man as a
creature, God could and did pronounce him to be "good" (Gen. 1: 31), but, with reference
to the prohibition concerning the tree of knowledge, and man's own moral nature, it was
impossible for him to be pronounced "good" apart from trial and proof. Moral good
cannot be ready-made; it must be acquired. The possibility of evil was incipient in the
creation of a moral being.
There were three ways in which evil could have been prevented:
(1) God could have created a being who was incapable of sinning. Had He done so, the creature
thus formed could never have risen above the level of a brute beast. His actions would have
been governed by the promptings of instinct, and would have had no moral value.
(2) God could have created a being capable of sinning, and yet have kept him from all possible
internal and external temptation. Had man been thus formed and hedged about, he would
have remained innocent, but would never have been upright. He would have been innocent
as an animal is innocent, but could never have been upright as a man is upright.
(3) God could have created man, and allowed temptation, and yet have prevented him yielding to
it. If this had been done, the very act would have destroyed the moral nature that had been
formed. Enforced goodness, coerced love, compulsory worship are contradictions.
Goodness, love and worship are emptied of their essential meaning the moment the
principle of compulsion enters. God can create innocent beings, but in the very nature of
things, the creation of a virtuous character or a ready-made righteousness is impossible. A
virtuous character cannot be bestowed by Divine fiat.