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#3.
The constitution of an assertion.
pp. 116, 117
In our last article we sought to show the importance that attaches to the correct naming
of objects and ideas; and we now extend our study to consider the nature of an
assertion:--
"Logic is the theory of proof, but proof supposes something proveable, which must be
a proposition or assertion; since nothing but a proposition can be an object of belief, or
therefore of proof. A proposition is discourse which affirms or denies something of some
other thing. This is one step: there must, it seems, be two things concerned in every act
of belief."
The reader may perhaps appreciate this statement better after considering an example.
Suppose, for instance, we have the word "scripture" or "sin" or "sacrifice". The word,
standing alone, does not assert or deny anything; but if I say, "Scripture is true" or
"Scripture is false" or even "Scripture exists", I have made a proposition which is capable
of proof, faith or rejection.
"There must, it seems, be two things concerned in every act of belief. But what are
these things? They can be no other than those signified by the two names, which being
joined together by a copula (is or are) constitute the proposition. If, therefore, we knew
what all names signify, we should know everything which, in the existing state of human
knowledge, is capable either of being made a subject of affirmation or denial."
To the student of Scripture these are weighty words. We have a revelation from God,
and we entertain no doubts concerning the truth and accuracy of every part of its
teaching. What an incentive, then, to study that Word and to arrive at a scriptural
definition of every item of truth which it contains. Then, with no errors in our premises,
our understanding of the truth of God would be clear and convincing.
A name is something concerning which something can be predicated, for example:
"stone is heavy"; "snow is white." A moment's thought, however, will bring to mind
many "names" that are not, like "stone", or "snow", concrete, so that some "right
division" of the large family of names will be of value.
Aristotle divided all existing things into "categories"--a word which is used many
times in the N.T. in the sense of "accusation":--
"Where are thine accusers (kategoros)?" (John 8: 10).
"What accusation (kategoria) bring ye?" (John 18: 29).
"There is one that accuseth (kategoreo) you?" (John 5: 45).
Every "name", then, can be "accused" of something. When we say, "The man
walked" or "The man is tall", we, in logic, "accuse" that man of a certain action, just as,
in another sense, we accuse him when we say, "The man is a murderer". Aristotle's