Jehovah shall man live.' Yet another rendering of Onkelos is significantly illustrative of 1 Cor. x. 1-4. He
renders Deut. xxxiii. 3 `with power He brought them out of Egypt; they were led under thy cloud; they
journeyed according to (by) thy Memra.' Does this represent a difference in Hebrew from the admittedly
difficult text in our present Bible? Winer refers to it as an instance in which Onkelos `suopte ingenio et
copiose admodum eloquitur vatum divinorum mentem,' adding, `ita ut de his, quas singulis vocibus
inesse crediderit, significationibus non possit recte judicari;' and Winer's successors say much the
same. But this is to state, not to explain, the difficulty. In general, we may here be allowed to say that
the question of the Targumim has scarcely received as yet sufficient treatment. Mr. Deutsch's Article in
Smith's `Dictionary of the Bible' (since reprinted in his `Remains') is, though brilliantly written,
unsatisfactory. Dr. Davidson (in Kitto's Cyclop., vol. iii. pp. 948-966) is, as always, careful, laborious,
and learned. Dr. Volck's article (in Herzog's Real-Encykl., vol. xv. pp. 672-683) is without much intrinsic
value, though painstaking. We mention these articles, besides the treatment of the subject in the
Introduction to the Old Testament (Keil, De Wette-Schrader, Bleek-kamphausen, Reuss), and the works
of Zunz, Geiger, Noldeke, and others, to whom partial reference has already been made. Frankel's
interesting and learned book (Zu dem Targum der Propheten) deals almost exclusively with the Targum
Jonathan, on which it was impossible to enter within our limits. As modern brochures of interest the
following three may be mentioned: Maybaum, Anthropomorphien bei Onkelos; Grönemann, Die Jonath.
Pentat. Uebers. im Verhaltn. z. Halacha; and Singer, Onkelos im Verhaltn. z. Halacha.
37. Gen. xlix. 10, 11; Num. xxiv. 17.
If we now turn to the views expressed by Philo about the Logos we find that they are hesitating,
and even contradictory. One thing, however, is plain: the Logos of Philo is not the Memra of the
Targumim. For, the expression Memra ultimately rests on theological, that of Logos on
philosophical grounds. Again, the Logos of Philo approximates more closely to the Metatron of
the Talmud and Kabbalah. As they speak of him as the `Prince of the Face,' who bore the
name of his Lord, so Philo represents the Logos as `the eldest Angel,' `the many-named
Archangel,' in accordance with the Jewish view that the name JeHoVaH unfolded its meaning in
seventy names for the Godhead.38 As they speak of the `Adam Qadmon,' so Philo of the Logos
as the human reflection of the eternal God. And in both these respects, it is worthy of notice that
he appeals to ancient teaching.39
38. See the enumeration of these 70 Names in the Baal-ha-Turim on Numb. xi. 16.
39. Comp. Siegfried, u. s., pp. 221-223.
What, then, is the Logos of Philo? Not a concrete personality, and yet, from another point of
view, not strictly impersonal, nor merely a property of the Deity, but the shadow, as it were,
which the light of God casts - and if Himself light, only the manifested reflection of God, His
spiritual, even as the world is His material, habitation. Moreover, the Logos is `the image of
God' (εικων ) upon which man was made,40 or, to use the platonic term, `the archetypal idea.'
As regards the relation between the Logos and the two fundamental Potencies (from which all
others issue), the latter are variously represented - on the one hand, as proceeding from the
Logos; and on the other, as themselves constituting the Logos. As regards the world, the Logos
is its real being. He is also its archetype; moreover the instrument (οργανον) through Whom
God created all things. If the Logos separates between God and the world, it is rather as
intermediary; He separates, but He also unites. But chiefly does this hold true as regards the
relation between God and man. The Logos announces and interprets to man the will and mind