supposed to have set David right on halakhic questions, as Mippi bosheth: `from my mouth shaming,'
`because he put to shame the face of David in the Halakhah.' Similarly in Siphré (Par. Behaalothekha, ed.
Friedmann, p. 20 a) we have very beautiful and ingenious interpretations of the names Reuel, Hobab
and Jethro .
From the consideration of the method by which Philo derived from Scriptures his theological
views, we turn to a brief analysis of these views.16
16. It would be impossible here to give the references, which would occupy too much space.
1. Theology. - In reference to God, we find, side by side, the apparently contradictory views
of the Platonic and the Stoic schools. Following the former, the sharpest distinction was
drawn between God and the world. God existed neither in space, nor in time; He had
neither human qualities nor affections; in fact, He was without any qualities (αποιος), and
even without any name (αρρητος) ; hence, wholly uncognisable by man
(ακαταληπτος). Thus, changing the punctuation and the accents, the LXX. of Gen. iii. 9
was made to read: `Adam, thou art somewhere;' but God had no somewhere, as Adam
seemed to think when he hid himself from Him. In the above sense, also, Ex. iii. 14, and vi.
3, were explained, and the two names Elohim and Jehovah belonged really to the two
supreme Divine `Potencies,' while the fact of God's being uncognisable appeared from Ex.
xx. 21.
But side by side with this we have, to save the Jewish, or rather Old Testament, idea of
creation and providence, the Stoic notion of God as immanent in the world - in fact, as that
alone which is real in it, as always working: in short, to use his own Pantheistic expression,
as `Himself one and the all' (εις και το παν). Chief in His Being is His goodness, the
forthgoing of which was the ground of creation. Only the good comes from Him. With
matter He can have nothing to do - hence the plural number in the account of creation. God
only created the soul, and that only of the good. In the sense of being `immanent,' God is
everywhere - nay, all things are really only in Him, or rather He is the real in all. But chiefly
is God the wellspring and the light of the soul - its `Saviour' from the `Egypt' of passion.
Two things follow. With Philo's ideas of the separation between God and matter, it was
impossible always to account for miracles or interpositions. Accordingly, these are
sometimes allegorised, sometimes rationalistically explained. Further, the God of Philo,
whatever he might say to the contrary, was not the God of that Israel which was His chosen
people.
2. Intermediary Beings. - Potencies (δυναµεις, λογοι). If, in what has preceded, we have
once and again noticed a remarkable similarity between Philo and the Rabbis, there is a still
more curious analogy between his teaching and that of Jewish Mysticism, as ultimately fully
developed in the `Kabbalah.' The very term Kabbalah (from qibbel, to hand down) seems
to point out not only its descent by oral tradition, but also its ascent to ancient sources.17 Its
existence is presupposed, and its leading ideas are sketched in the Mishnah.18 The Targums
also bear at least one remarkable trace of it. May it not be, that as Philo frequently refers to
ancient tradition, so both Eastern and Western Judaism may here have drawn from one and