| An Alphabetical Analysis Volume 7 - Doctrinal Truth - Page 63 of 297 INDEX | |
The twofold usage of the word 'determine' in our language is an
interesting example of the difference between what is mechanical and what is
moral.
(1)
'I am determined to face the wind'.
(2)
'Dust is determined to go with the wind'.
In the first case a resolution is made after due consideration, a
definite choice arrived at after pondering alternatives. In the second case
there is no choice, and there can never have been an alternative.
It is obviously foolish to speak of a 'will' apart from the person that
wills, and it is equally absurd to talk of evil as though it existed
somewhere in the universe as a thing in itself. Moral evil cannot be
created, or come into existence, apart from moral beings who actually do what
is wrong. When we discuss the existence of evil apart from the actions of
those who act wrongly, we are inventing difficulties which have no real
existence. The problem of evil is the problem of personality. If a moral
person, who is held accountable for his actions, transgresses a prohibition
and thereby comes under a penalty, it is utterly wrong to charge the One Who
lays down the prohibition and inflicts the penalty with the creation of the
evil thus punished. If such a state could be conceived, anything would be
possible, and the whole groundwork of truth would dissolve. Under such
conditions nothing would or could matter. To speak of predetermined sin
would be a contradiction, for sin is the transgression of a law, and a
predetermined act is itself of the very essence of law. Obedience and
disobedience in this case would be quite irrelevant.
In the story of the garden of Eden, we must not imagine some insidious
trap, definitely placed there so that man should fall into it. We must
realize, rather, that man, as a moral creature, had to be tested. In the law
we read:
'If ye will not be reformed by Me by these things, but will walk
contrary unto Me; then will I also walk contrary unto you, and will
punish you yet seven times for your sins' (Lev. 26:23,24).
'If', 'Then'. These words would mean less than nothing if it had
already been predetermined that Israel would in fact 'walk contrary'.
Indeed, if it had been decreed that Israel should act in this way, then their
so-called 'contrary' actions would actually be in 'agreement' with the Divine
intention, and sin would become an impossibility. 'To be forewarned is to be
forearmed', and the very knowledge of what in the natural course of things
will inevitably happen, becomes by the interposition of moral agency a means
of falsifying such apparent predetermination.
It is possible that an objection may have formed itself in the minds of
some of our readers in connection with the statement made above that evil
cannot be 'created'. In Isaiah 45:7 we read:
'I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil:
I the Lord do all these things'.
The word translated 'evil' here is the Hebrew ra. So far as its usage
is concerned, there are about an equal number of passages where the word
means 'moral evil' or 'sin', and where the word means 'evil' in the sense of