'This is perhaps the commonest fault of any, as we are apt to feel

satisfied if our definition covers the case we have in our immediate

view, and to omit to examine whether it does not also admit something

else of which we were not at the moment thinking' (Venn).

'A definition must not contain the name defined', says Jevons, for by

subjecting a term to definition we assume that it is not thoroughly

understood, and the repetition of the unknown term cannot therefore make it

The following are examples of definitions faulty in this respect:

A noun is the name of anything.

Life is the sum of vital functions.

The fact that 'noun' and 'name', 'life' and 'vital' are essentially

identical is sufficient to render the definition valueless:

'A definition must not be negative where it can be affirmative'

The importance of all this to the student of Scripture, the teacher and

preacher, requires we trust, no further emphasis.  Before any article of our

faith can be clearly believed by ourselves, or made known to others, it must

be thrown into the form of a proposition that either affirms or denies some

attribute of the subject.  How can we affirm or deny if we use our terms

loosely?  What an incentive, therefore, to go to the Scriptures and seek true

definitions that shall be neither too wide nor too narrow; that shall be

reciprocal, grammatical and unambiguous.  Surely every reader will feel a

desire to be able thus to complete the following affirmation: God is ...

Faith is ...  Sin is ...  Justification is ...  Sanctification is ...  etc.

To do this is to have taken a great step toward that understanding which

Scripture itself places so highly.

We have now run over the chief elements that go to compose a

proposition.  Logic, strictly speaking, is occupied with proof, not

assertion, but in our consideration we are free to bring forward any and all

aspects of the question as to what constitutes a valid argument.  Many a time

the error does not lie in the mode of reasoning, but in the proposition

itself and, therefore, before proceeding to give some idea of the syllogism,

and its use in arriving at a 'proof', we will bring together in this study

one or two somewhat axiomatic notes concerning assertions or propositions.

An assertion has reference to facts contained in a proposition.  A

proof discriminates between true and false propositions.  Assertion,

moreover, cannot be separated from the kindred study of the meaning of words,

definition, and the like:

'Every proposition asserts that some given subject does or does not

possess some attribute, or that some attribute is or is not (either in

all, or in some portion, of the subject in which it is met with)

conjoined with some other attribute'.